narratives. 2 In three of these narratives-those describing God's promises to Noah and his companions on Mount Ararat, to Abraham in Canaan, and to Moses and the Israelites on Mount Sinai-the author presents his subjects as entering into agreements involving increasingly specific conceptions of government and law. 3 These agreements are of the sort that modern political philosophy refers to as social compacts. In this respect, the author's theory anticipates the work of political philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls, who also emphasize, in different ways, notions of the consent of the governed as fundamental to the legitimacy of political authority.
Theory
Consent to a social compact under conditions that ensure the fairness of the decision generates four powerful arguments for obligation.
1. Because the subject has consented to the arrangement, it can be inferred that he considers himself better off accepting the obligations of the compact than he would be under any available alternative arrangement. Accordingly, so long as the agenda is fairso long as the subject is given an appropriate set of options -it seems consistent with the person's individual welfare and best interests that he should be held to the terms of the bargain at future times.
2. Because the subject has agreed to a government that can exercise coercion in appropriate cases, it appears to be much less of an intrusion on that person's autonomy when the force is actually applied. This is so even if, at the time of enforcement, the individual objects to the actions being taken.
3. If the consent is given under conditions of mutuality, then others have given their own consent in reliance on the subject also submitting to the authority of the state.
That reliance would be frustrated if the subject were allowed to renege on a promise once given. Because the subject knows of this reliance at the time he consents, it is appropriate that he be held to the terms of his bargain ex post.
4. Consent in social contract theories is presented as unanimous. So long as a suitable set of options is presented, the arrangements that result from the social compact enjoying the unanimous consent of the parties should satisfy the economic criterion for welfare maximization that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off. * * * Despite these important advantages, consent theory also faces significant obstacles:
1. People rarely manifest express consent to government and never do so in a grand assembly involving everyone else in the society. It is for this reason that consent theories become unconvincing fictions to the extent that they suggest that a moment of universal agreement ever occurred.
2. Even when people do manifest consent, their actions may not be truly voluntary. If they know they are being observed by a powerful party who might be displeased if they withhold their consent, they may decide to manifest consent to a proposal even though they do not really agree.
3. Consent is not meaningful if the person who is manifesting it does not have a full understanding of his options. If, with complete information, he would withhold consent, then the consent given under partial information is not a full, fair, and informed agreement to the terms on offer.
4. Consent is not meaningful if the options presented to the subject are less desirable than some other option that is not presented. The problem here is that if the decision set is restricted to undesirable choices, then the fact that subjects consent to one rather than another is not very informative (when the armed robber says "your money or your life," you do not evidence a wish to give your cash to a complete stranger when you select the former). 5. What about people who dissent from the compact? It is difficult to justify imposing a social compact on those who do not consent. It is not enough that most or even the vast majority of people have consented, since the dissenter has not agreed to be bound by the decision of a majority. Any decision rule short of unanimity thus raises a problem of coercion.
6. Consent theory must also address the problem of those who do not participate in the convention or those who are born after the convention has occurred. Even if it is appropriate to impose the coercive force of government on people who have actually consented, how is it legitimate to extend the coercion to people who were not given the opportunity to choose?
7. Consent theory must address the issue of whether consent is given absolutely and for all time or is subject to conditions that, if they occur, will release the subject from his obligations.
* * *
The challenge for any consent theory-including the consent theory found in the Bible-is to devise an account that achieves the benefits of consent in terms of justifying political obligation while avoiding or mitigating the objections and limitations to the theory. The biblical author's consent theory is no exception. Like other consent theorists, the author seeks to establish a strong norm of obligation and, in the process, to address the various objections and limitations that have troubled later thinkers.
The setup of the biblical covenants differs, of course, from the situation facing modern philosophical accounts. One distinction is that the Bible purports to be history.
Since the author is the one writing the history, he can solve some of the problems of consent theory by ipse dixit: he can assert as historical fact circumstances that the authors of later philosophical works had to establish by logic or argument. An example is the question whether the parties to the social compact actually consent to its terms. For the biblical author, the problem can be addressed by the simple expedient of declaring that everyone agreed.
A more fundamental difference is that the biblical covenants usually concern arrangements between man and God, not man and man. The presence of God as a party to these agreements affects the analysis because of the vast difference in status between the counterparties. For example, it could be seen as insulting to the dignity of God to portray his human counterparties as having the right to reject his proposals. Being divine, God should not have to ask for the approval of any human being; he should simply announce his judgment and expect humans to comply. This consideration creates a difficulty for the author because he needs to tread carefully around the proposition that human beings have the ability to bargain with God.
While these are important differences, they should not be overstated. The author also wanted to persuade his readers. Accordingly the author wants the covenants to appear reasonable when judged from a purely human perspective. For this reason, the author's responses to problems in the biblical setup often anticipate arguments found in the modern philosophical tradition.
Noah
This story in Gen 8, the first of the great biblical covenant narratives, is appropriately also the most fundamental. At issue is the basic idea of government and law. Noah and his companions are refugees from a Dark Age in which the absence of government and law had allowed society to descend in a horrifying spiral of violence and retribution. Recognizing that if he does not intervene, the cycle will only repeat itself the next time around, God offers human beings a deal. He will never again destroy the world, but they must agree to live under government and law. That agreement is symbolized by two obligations: (a) the rule against eating meat with the lifeblood still in it, a direct parallel to the rule against eating the forbidden fruit that symbolizes God's rule in the garden of Eden; and (b) the rule on spilling of blood, which is a primitive version of the talion law designed to stop the cycle of violence that had doomed the prior dispensation.
By accepting this deal Noah and his companions seal the primal social compact-the basic agreement to live under government and law and not in anarchy.
5
The story of Noah's covenant raises a number of issues for a consent theory of obligation:
1. Even though the counterparties do not manifest express consent to this covenant, the author suggests that consent did in fact occur. It is true that there is no bargaining. God simply announces the covenant and all of its terms. Presumably this is due to the dignitary concerns mentioned above: it would not do to suggest that Noah had the right to reject God's proposal. Yet the overall tenor of the narrative suggests that
Noah and the others actually consented to the arrangement. God himself refers to the transaction as a "covenant," a term that usually implies a mutual exchange of promises.
Noah does not object to the deal that God announces. And the covenant occurs around a ritual of sacrifice that throughout the Bible expresses acceptance of communal obligations.
2. The author argues, moreover, that Noah's consent was given freely and of his own volition. It is true that Noah is in a weak bargaining position. He is dealing with an all-powerful and rather irascible deity who has just destroyed the world-not exactly a situation where one should quibble about the fine print. Noah arguably had little choice but to agree. Nevertheless, Noah initiates the sacrifice: it is Noah who calls God to parlay, not the other way around. This detail suggests that Noah's consent to the covenant is freely and voluntarily given. The terms of the covenant reinforce this inference, since they so heavily favor Noah and his companions. Noah and his family are protected against the world ever being destroyed again and are given blessings of fertility and prosperity to boot. Who could object to that? The obligations God demands in exchange are either not onerous or in the people's long-range interest. It is therefore easy to conclude that consent to this covenant is volitional and not made under conditions of duress.
3. The author also argues that Noah's covenant is made under appropriate knowledge conditions. As refugees from the Dark Age, Noah and his family are aware that social conditions had descended into chaos in a system without government and law.
They do not know exactly what the world will be like with government and law, but they may remember stories about the garden of Eden and the blissful harmony that was manifested in that setting. Even if they do not remember that far back, they still have reason to believe that the new dispensation will be better than the old one since it could hardly be worse. The setup, moreover, argues that the participants have an ability to judge the future. They are on top of a mountain-apparently the highest one around,
given that this is where the ark washed up-and they can look down at the lands cleansed by the flood-lands they will soon be colonizing. Symbolically, they have a vision of the future that informs and substantiates their agreement to the new dispensation. Thus they have the basic data necessary to assess the matter on offer from God and to make a wellinformed decision about whether to accept the proposal. determine what form of government should be adopted. Noah is not presented with a set of less-than-optimal choices. Thus, God's control of the agenda does not unfairly skew the outcome. 5. The author argues that consent was unanimous.
(a) In part, he does this through ipse dixit: he simply tells the story in such a way as to suggest that there was no dissent.
(b) Because God's offer never to destroy the world was so generous and the terms he required in exchange were so reasonable, most people would consent because the new dispensation is, in general, so much better than the prior one.
(c) Unanimity is also assured by the knowledge conditions available to the participants. Recall that the covenant takes place just after Noah and his companions have left the ark. As we have seen, they know what life was like under anarchy (not good), and they have a basis for predicting what life will be like under government and law (better).
They are in possession of all the general knowledge they need to make an informed decision. But they lack other information that will be important in the world to come.
They have no possessions, no land, no flocks-no entitlements of any sort. All of the endowments that people acquired during the Dark Age are gone: there are no cities, no great families, no specialized crafts or guilds. Later on, of course, Noah's descendants will obtain different positions in the world-as illustrated by Noah's judgment in response to Ham's transgression, which establishes a hierarchy among Noah's sons. But at the time of Noah's covenant, no such hierarchies exist. The conditions on Mount
Ararat thus satisfy the "veil of ignorance" criterion, famously set forth in the work of the American political philosopher John Rawls, which holds that fair principles of justice are those that would be adopted by decision makers who act with general knowledge of the world but without knowledge of their personal endowments. 7 The author, in other words, has crafted, in narrative form, the essential conditions for fair decision that were formalized only in the last century by Rawls and others. (a) The author has a simple answer to this problem. Unlike modern philosophers, who generally reject the idea that the consent of an ancestor can obligate his descendants, the author believes that obligations can run with the generations. He is explicit on this point: the obligations bind not only Noah but also "your descendants after you" (Gen 9:9). In imposing the obligations on later generations, the author draws on well-accepted legal principles of his time that recognized that in certain circumstances the acts of an ancestor can legally bind descendants (e.g., Exod 20:5; 34:7; Num 14:18; Deut 5:9; but see Deut 24:16). The assumption that Noah's covenant binds later generations relieves the author of the inconvenience of attributing some form of consent to people who were not present at the time the covenant was adopted. binding effect of these promises may depend on whether the human counterparty has satisfied some condition precedent to God's obligation. In the case of Noah's covenant, however, the author makes it clear that God's performance is unconditional: it is an "everlasting" obligation (Gen 9:16). The reason for the lack of conditions has to do with God's assessment that "every inclination of the thoughts of [man's] heart was only evil all the time" (Gen 6:5). Since human beings are fundamentally flawed, there is nothing they can do that will disappoint God so deeply that he will consider it necessary to destroy the world again.
9 See Laurence A. Turner, "The Rainbow as the Sign of the Covenant in Genesis IX 11-13," VT 43 (1993): 119-24. 10 There is no basis to consider that the symbol of the rainbow represents God's war bow or any other specific object (for criticism of the "war bow" hypothesis, see Turner, "The Rainbow as the Sign of the Covenant," 119-24). The rainbow is used in the narrative simply because it is ubiquitous in human experience and has desirable line-of-sight attributes to signify the generality of the covenant promises.
God's covenant with Abraham is set forth in Gen 15. 11 God appears to Abraham at an undisclosed location in the land of Canaan and tells him not to fear (Gen 15:1).
Abraham complains that he is childless and that a servant will inherit his estate (Gen 15:2-3). God foretells that Abraham will have a son and that his descendants will be as 
The author argues that Abraham's consent was voluntary. Throughout the Bible
Abraham is the loyal servant of God. In the Akedah episode, he willingly goes along with God's instructions to sacrifice his own son. Given Abraham's character and relationship with God, it is inconceivable that he would not willingly consent to this covenant.
Volition is also indicated by the fact that Abraham engages in a dialogue with God about both parts of the covenant, the promise of an heir and the promise of the land. He demands assurances as to both, and gets them. The terms of God's promises, moreover, are so favorable to Abraham that his volition cannot seriously be questioned. Who, after all, would be heard to complain when, wandering around with no property and no heir, he is informed that he will found a great nation and possess a wonderful land?
The author argues that Abraham is equipped with the information he needs to
give informed consent. God takes pains to provide Abraham with all the necessary data, not only about the past (God's bringing Abraham out of Ur of the Chaldees) but also the future (the sojourn in Egypt, the oppression, the exodus, and the conquest of the promised land). As to the promise of descendants, Abraham knows the pain of childlessness-it is the first thing on his mind when God appears to him-and also can anticipate the joy of having heirs. Similarly, with respect to the promise of the land, since he has seen the land of Canaan firsthand, he can assess its worth and compare it with the qualities of other territories. Thus he has the requisite basis on which to make a decision, both with respect to God's promise of a patrimony and to God's promise of the land.
The author provides two arguments for the proposition that Abraham is
presented with fair options.
(a) First, the decision is basic. What is in issue is whether a particular people should come together as a people-whether they should make common cause in solidarity with one another. Abraham is not here asked to decide on any particular form of government or law-that will come later, in the covenant at Sinai. Abraham is asked simply to agree that he will become the father of a nation and proprietor of the promised land and that in return he will worship and be loyal to God. Because the decision is basic, it does not represent an unfair decision between less desirable choices that leaves a more desirable option off the table.
(b) Second, the author argues that the options presented to Abraham are fair because Abraham affirmatively influences the content of the deal. Because Abraham, the party receiving the promises, participates in shaping the agenda, the author establishes that the subject matter of the covenant is one that offers genuine value to the human counterparty.
The author establishes that consent to this covenant was unanimous:
(a) This proposition follows trivially from the fact that only Abraham is involved.
Abraham cannot dissent from his own decision.
(b) The author also argues that this covenant is fair to all affected parties, so that and eagerness to see God, even at risk to their lives; the fact that here, unlike the other covenants just discussed, they voice consent explicitly; and the evident undesirability of the alternative, which is to remain indefinitely in the state of nomadism rather than moving forward toward the blessings of living within an established territory.
3. The Sinai narrative also deals with the issue of the information set available to the parties. information that the God they are dealing with is a powerful deity who cares about them and who can be trusted to act in their best interests and to perform his promises.
(b) The information set available to the participants in the other versions of the Sinai covenant is much greater. Like a financial prospectus that bombards investors with so much data that they cannot separate the forest from the trees, the Israelites are supplied with a mind-numbing plethora of laws, rules, and regulations. Many a bar mitzvah boy has struggled through Torah portions covering these texts. Yet God also helpfully provides an executive summary, in the form of the Ten Commandments, to which the readers can refer if they do not wish to parse out all the provisions on the priestly garments. At least the detailed information is there if the decision-maker wishes to refer to it. Overall the information set is sufficient to support a knowing, conscious, and deliberate consent.
4. The author also defends the covenant at Sinai against the charge of agenda manipulation. Two fundamental decisions have been made already at this point: to accept government and law (the covenant with Noah) and to join in solidarity with one another and to submit to the authority of Israel's God (the covenant with Abraham). The Sinai covenant addresses the next question by asking what form government should take. It offers the Israelites a choice of two models: nomadism, which has proven to be unsatisfactory, or nationhood, symbolized by the opportunity to accept national laws coupled with a bonded promise to deliver control over territory in the form of the promised land. This latter opportunity is exactly what they should aspire to and accordingly is not simply one of a set of undesirable alternatives.
It is true, of course, that certain versions of the covenant at Sinai do more than
give the Israelites the general form of laws; they are a turnkey deal in which a mass of detailed laws are acquired on a wholesale basis. To this extent, agenda setting could be problematic for consent theory because it is possible that some other set of laws would be better still than those on offer. The author addresses this problem with the detail about
Moses' visits to God on the top of the mountain. If Moses was simply going to receive a set of laws, he would not need to remain as God's guest for forty days and forty nights.
God could give Moses the tablets and send him on his way. Perhaps God was being a good host to an honored guest in keeping Moses on the mountain for so long. More likely, the detail of Moses' stays on Mount Sinai reflects the suggestion-one that cannot quite be made explicit out of respect for the dignity of God-that Moses was working with God to develop the laws and regulations that he later brings down to the people. If
Moses did provide input to God with respect to the formulation of the laws, this would tend to substantiate the inference that the choice given to the Israelites represents a good option among possible decision sets.
5. The Sinai covenant deals with the issue of unanimity:
(a) The author simply asserts that the decision was unanimous. The people "all responded together" in approving the deal (Exod 19:8; 24:7) . In contrast to the frequent occurrence of murmuring and dissatisfaction among the people elsewhere in the wilderness wanderings, the people never manifest dissent or disagreement with the fundamental terms of the deal on offer at Sinai.
(b) The author suggests that the terms of the covenant were so beneficial as to generate a unanimous response (the argument is a bit circular here, however: the author suggests both that the people's unanimous approval of the covenant is evidence that its terms are beneficial and also that the beneficial nature of the terms is evidence that the people were unanimous). At the same time, the tribes know nothing about the allotments that await them in the promised land. They do not know if their properties will be near the sea or inland; if their lands will be fertile or not; if they will have a large territory or a small one-or even no territory at all (the fate that awaits the tribe of Levi). Those questions will be answered author's answer to this problem is that the consent is given by authorized agents who act as loyal representatives of the people's best interests.
(b) The author also addresses the problem of future generations. He has access here to the same answer that served him with respect to the covenants with Noah and Abraham: if appropriately phrased and structured, promises made by an ancestor can run with the generations, so the covenant made by the Israelites on Sinai is binding on all their descendants. Yet this argument is less satisfactory in the case of the Sinai narrative because the author is dealing with political rather than patriarchal power. It is more persuasive to suggest that an ancestor can make promises that bind his descendants than that a political leader or even the public as a whole can bind future members of the polity.
The author recognizes this problem in Deuteronomy when Joshua reminds the Israelites Such an argument is available in the form of the concept of covenant renewal.
The Bible records a number of instances in which Israelites assemble, not for the purpose of entering into a new covenant with God but rather for the purpose of affirming and renewing a covenant already made. Deuteronomy 31, for example, reports that Moses wrote down the law and entrusted it to the Levites, instructing them to place it in the ark.
Moses then declares: "At the end of every seven years, in the year for canceling debts, during the Festival of Tabernacles, when all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your
God at the place he will choose, you shall read this law before them in their hearing.
Assemble the people-men, women and children, and the foreigners residing in your towns-so they can listen and learn to fear the Lord your God and follow carefully all the words of this law. Their children, who do not know this law, must hear it and learn to fear the Lord your God as long as you live in the land you are crossing the Jordan to possess" (Deut 31:9-13). In other words, the law is to be publicly read to all residents-citizens and foreigners alike-every seven years, so that those who have already consented may reaffirm their vows and persons who have not previously entered into the covenant may agree to its terms. 
